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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction rests upon Utah Code Ann. sec. 78A-3-102(3)(a).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
ISSUE 1:

Whether the court of appeals erred in its application of relevant precedent
to the facts of this case.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the
trial court. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 5, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102. This
Court gives the court of appeals' "conclusions of law no deference."
Bluemel v. Utah, 2007 UT 90, f 9, 173 P.3d 842.

ISSUE 2:

Whether the court of appeals erred in declining to consider Petitioner's
discussion of Lovelandv. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and
Smith v. Frandsen, 94 P.3d 919 (Utah 2001), in their reply brief on appeal
and in treating similar contentions as not being raised in their initial brief.
Standard of Review: On certiorari, the Utah Supreme Court reviews
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, not the decision of the
trial court. Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 5, 162 P.3d 1099, 1102. This
Court gives the court of appeals' "conclusions of law no deference."
Bluemel v. Utah, 2007 UT 90, \ 9, 173 P.3d 842.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ETC.

None.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Plaintiffs/Petitioners David and Kristine Anderson filed suit against
Defendant/Respondent Matthew Kriser on April 5, 2007. (R. at 1-39.) The Andersons
alleged a single cause of action of fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser. (R. at 3-4.)
The Andersons argued that Kriser sold them a residential lot with collapsible soils, that
Kriser knew about a geotechnical report that contained information about the collapsible
soils, but that Kriser failed to disclose the existence or contents of that report to the
Andersons. (R. at 1-39.)
On May 15, 2008, Kriser moved for summary judgment, arguing he did not know
about the existence or contents of the geotechnical report and that he did not know the
property had collapsible soils. (R. at 90-159.) The Andersons timely opposed the motion
(r. at 195-244), and Kriser timely filed a reply memorandum (r. at 246-301).
On September 22, 2008, the trial court heard oral argument on Kriser's motion.
(R. at 306-07.) A few weeks later, on October 8, 2008, the court issued an ephemeral
written decision granting Kriser's summary judgment motion on one ground: that
although the Andersons alleged fraudulent non-disclosure against Kriser for failing "to
disclose the presence of collapsible soils that made the real property unsuitable for the
construction of a residence," the Andersons "failed to provide any evidence that Matthew
Kriser knew that the real property in question had collapsible soils unsuitable for the
construction of a residence." (R. at 323-24.)
The Andersons filed their Notice ofAppeal on November 6, 2008. (R. at 344-46.)

The Utah Court of Appeals took the case, and without oral argument, it issued a
memorandum decision on November 5, 2009 affirming the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor Kriser. Anderson v. Kriser, 2009 UT App 319, ^f 1. (A copy of the
court of appeals' opinion is attached hereto as Addendum A.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Earthtec Engineering Conducts a Geotechnical Analysis
of the Aspen Cove Subdivision in December 1997
On December 2, 1997, Earthtec Engineering, P.C. issued a report containing the
results of a geotechnical analysis that Earthtec had conducted on the Aspen Cove
Subdivision ("Subdivision") in Pleasant Grove, Utah ("Geotech Report"). (R. at 217.)
Earthtec prepared the Geotech Report for Mr. Drew Kriser, a relative of
Defendant/Respondent Matthew Kriser. (R. at 217.)
Earthtec's Geotech Report contained many observations, warnings, and
recommendations that should have been followed before beginning residential
construction in the Subdivision. For example, the Geotech Report made the following
observations and warnings:
•

"the soil profile varied across the [Subdivision]" (r. at 218);

•

"the clays on the site were found to be soft and slightly collapsible when wetted"
(r. at 218, 221,223);

•

"[p] ro P er drainage is important to the performance of the footings for [the
structures that will be built]"(r. at 219);
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•

"[w]etting of the foundation soils may cause some degree of volume change
within the soil and should be prevented both during and after construction" (r. at
224).
In addition to these observations, the Geotech Report also warned to over-excavate

the footings, replace native soil with structural fill, and to keep water away from the
footings and foundations of the structures. Specifically, the report made the following
recommendations:
•

"[w]e recommend footings be extended into the dense native gravels or supported
on a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill for a bearing capacity of 1500 psf' (r.
at 218);

•

"[tjopsoil, man-made fill, or soils loosened by construction activities should be
removed from the building pad and pavement areas prior to foundation
excavations and site grading fills" (r. at 221);

•

"[foundations should be excavated down to the dense, sandy gravels or, if in silts
or clays, at least 12inches [sic] beyond the bottom footings" (r. at 221);

•

"[s]oft spots identified during proof rolling should be excavated and replaced with
structural fill" (r. at 221);

•

"we recommend spread footings be supported on structural fill or extended into
the dense native gravels" (r. at 223);

•

"[foundations should not be partially supported on structural fill and partially on
native soils.. . . [I]f structural fill is needed under any portion of the structure, then
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a minimum of 12 inches of structural fill should exist below the entire foundation"
(r. at 223);
•

"[g]round surface should be graded to drain away from the structures in all
directions" (r. at 224);

•

"[rjoof runoff should be collected in rain gutters with downspouts designed to
discharge well outside of the backfill limits" (r. at 225);

•

"[s]prinkler heads.. . should be aimed away from foundation walls" (r. at 225);

•

"[o]ther precautions which may become evident during design and construction
should be taken" (r. at 225).
Kriser Knows a Geotechnical Study Is Completed for the Subdivision
Kriser testified in his deposition that he knew Pleasant Grove City required a

geotechnical study before the streets could be put in. (R. at 202; Kriser Dep. 19:20-21.)
He went even further and clarified that he "knew that [a geotechnical report] had to be
done before [Pleasant Grove City] would allow us to develop [the Subdivision]." (R. at
202; Kriser Dep. 19:21-23.)
Thus, by the time Kriser was selling lots—and by his own admission—he knew a
geotechnical report had been completed. And as a seller and/or developer of real
property, he is charged (at minimum) with knowledge of the existence of the Geotech
Report. And more importantly, he has a legal duty to inform the Andersons of the report.
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The Andersons Purchase a Lot from Kriser (a Developer)
in April 1998—Four Months After the Earthtec Geotech Report—but
Kriser Does Disclose the Existence or Contents of the Report
In 1998, the Andersons approached Kriser to inquire about purchasing a lot in the
Aspen Cove "A" development in Pleasant Grove, Utah. (R. at 2, 199.) On April 30,
1998, the Andersons signed a one-page document, titled "Offer to Purchase" ("Offer"), to
buy lot number two in the development ("Property"). (R. at 2, 199.) The Offer included
a description of the Property and stated the purchase price. (R. at 199.)
Before purchasing the home, Kriser did not inform the Andersons about the
existence or contents of the Geotech Report. (R. at 199.) Moreover, the Andersons did
not discover the existence or contents of the Geotech Report for themselves or from any
other party. (R. at 199.)
Ultimately, the Andersons closed on their purchase on or about June 1, 1998. (R.
at 2.)
Shortly After Moving in,
the Andersons Discover Problems with Their New Home
After moving in, the Andersons discovered various unsuitable conditions related
to the underlying ground and soil beneath and surrounding their home. (R. at 2.) The
soil conditions resulted in significant damage to the Andersons' home, including but not
limited to settling in and around the home, cracking around windows, exterior cladding,
and cracking in concrete walls and in the basement slab. (R. at 2.)
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Kriser Visits the Andersons After they Filed Suit
After the Andersons filed this law suit, Kriser visited their home. (R. at 199.)
Among other things, Kriser told the Andersons that he saw in the 1997 Earthtec Geotech
Report that Earthtec had dug a test pit directly in front of the Andersons' home. (R. at
199-200.) Kriser also implied that he made a mistake by not disclosing the Earthtec
Geotech Report and by failing to follow its recommendations, saying, "We were a young
company at the time we did this development." (R. at 200.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The Utah Court of Appeals' mistakenly analogized the facts from Smith to this
case. The court erred in concluding that, because the developer in Smith was not liable to
the homeowner, the developer in this case (Kriser) is not liable to the homeowner (the
Andersons).
But that over-simplifies Smith and this case and ignores dispositive distinctions
between the two cases. In Smith, the developer did not sell the lot to the homeowner; it
sold the lot to another builder-contractor, who in turn sold the lot to the homebuyer.
Thus, the developer was not liable to the homeowner because he was not in privity with
the homeowner; the homeowner was not the developer's immediate transferee. In
contrast, in this case, the developer sold the lot directly to the homeowner. Thus, under
Smith (and Loveland and Yazd), the developer is liable for failing to disclose the Geotech
Report.
Next, the court of appeals erred by concluding that the Andersons' failed to raise
arguments in their opening brief, and therefore, waived them on appeal. Contrary to the
7

court's understanding, the Andersons5 simply elected to use principles of law from the
most recent case espousing those principles (Yazd) rather than prior cases that also quoted
the same language (Smith and Loveland). Therefore, the Andersons did not waive any
arguments on appeal by choosing to use this Court's most recent endorsements of a
developer's duty rather than the cases that came before it.
ARGUMENT
L

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS' OPINION CONTRADICTS THIS
COURT'S HOLDINGS FROM LOVELAND\ SMITH, AND YAZD THAT A
DEVELOPER OWES A DUTY OF DISCLOSURE TO HIS PURCHASERS.
The court of appeals misunderstood and misapplied this Court's precedents

regarding a developer's (as opposed to a builder's) duty when selling land on which a
residence will be built. Specifically, the opinion of the court of appeals contradicts with
this Court's holdings in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. Therefore, the Court should correct
the errors by reversing the court of appeals and remanding this matter to the trial court.
In this case, the appellate court affirmed the grant of summary judgment for Kriser
on the basis that ICriser was not the "builder-contractor" and, therefore, was not liable for
the settling and other damage to the Andersons' home. Specifically, the court of appeals
held that "[i]t is clear from Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, that ultimate
responsibility for the settling and other damage to the Andersons' house lies with the
builder-contractor who actually constructed it" Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, \ 6
(emphasis added).
The court of appeals' decision is premised on this Court's opinion in Smith,
focusing on paragraphs 14 to 27 from that case. Summarizing, in Smith, this Court found
8

that a developer did not owe a duty to a homeowner because the developer first sold the
lot to an intermediary contractor who then sold the lot to the homeowner. Smith, 2004
UT 55, Yi 14-27. The court of appeals misunderstood the law in Smith, applied that
misconception to this case, rendering the court of appeals' opinion in Anderson in direct
conflict with decisions of this Court in Loveland, Smith, and Yazd.
In Smith, this Court held that "a developer . . . has a duty to exercise reasonable
care to insure that the . .. lots are suitable for construction . . . and he must disclose to his
purchaser any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." Id. ^16 (citing Lovelandv.
Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 769 (Utah 1987) (emphases added)). The Court also
expressly stated that a developer carries a duty of care and disclosure to its immediate
transferees. Id. ^ 28.
Under the facts in Smith, the developer did not owe a duty to the homeowner
because the developer did not sell the lot to the homeowner, but rather, sold the lot a
"builder-contractor," who in turn, sold the home to the Smiths. Id. ffij 14-27. In that case,
the court placed the ultimate responsibility of disclosure on the contractor in privity with
the Smiths—not with the developer—because the developer conveyed the lot directly to
the contractor (who had knowledge and expertise, and adequate time and opportunity, to
discover the defects and who, in turn, conveyed the property to the homeowner). Id. ^
21. The developer, the Court held, was not liable to "remote purchasers" of the property,
e.g., the homeowner. Id. Hence, the Court's holding in Smith was that the ultimate
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responsibility for the settling and other damage lay with the party in privity with the
homeowner, which in Smith was the contractor. These are not the facts in this case.
In this case, the Andersons purchased a home directly from Kriser, the developer.
No intermediary contractor or other party interrupted the conveyance from developer to
homeowner. The Andersons and Kriser were in privity. Consequently, under Loveland,
Smith, and Yazd, Kriser had a "duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling
house and he must disclose to his purchaser any condition which he knows or
reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential
building'' Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769 (emphasis added) (reaffirmed and quoted in Smith
and Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp,, 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283). Kriser's failure to
disclose the Geotech Report makes him liable under Loveland, Smith, and Yazd for the
settling problems and the resulting damage that occurred.
The court of appeals mistakenly analogized the facts in Smith to this case when it
affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment. Under the reasoning in Smith (as
established in Loveland and reaffirmed in Yazd), the developer's duty is not eliminated
where the homeowner purchased the lot directly from the developer. And the court of
appeals erred by concluding that "ultimate responsibility for the settling and other
damage to the Andersons' home lies with the builder-contractor who actually constructed
it." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, ^f 6. A developer is not relieved of liability simply
because a different builder-contractor builds the home. That sentiment directly
contradicts Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. A developer's "duty of care and disclosure
10

extendfs]... to its immediate transferees," Smith, 2004 UT 55, ^ 28, including the
homeowner. Indeed, no transferee is more immediate than a homeowner who purchased
a lot directly from a developer. And that is precisely the case here.
Because the court of appeals mistakenly applied Smith in affirming the trial
court's grant of summary judgment to Kriser, the Court should reverse and remand.
IL

THE COURT OF APPEALS MISTAKENLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
ANDERSONS FAILED TO RAISE CERTAIN CASES AND/OR
ARGUMENTS IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO KRISER'S SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND IN THE ANDERSONS' OPENING BRIEF.
Next, the court of appeals errs in concluding that the Andersons did not present

authority for the proposition that "Kriser's alleged knowledge of the existence of the
[Geotech] Report placed him on notice of its contents." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, f

The court's statement is wrong on for two reasons.
First, the statement of law is incorrect (a developer does not need to have "actual
contents" of a geotechnical report before being liable for failing to disclose its existence
to a buyer when the developer is in privity with the buyer). Second, the Andersons did
1

Similarly, in paragraph 6 of its opinion, the court of appeals similarly states that
"[b]ecause Kriser did not construct the Andersons' home, Yazd neither imposes a duty
nor imputes any knowledge to Kriser. Accordingly, Yazd does not require us to disturb
the district court's summary judgment ruling." Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, ^ 6
(footnote omitted).
The court of appeals missed the point. The Andersons cited Yazd for the principle
of law that a developer has certain duties, taken from and consistent with this Court's
holdings in Smith and Loveland. The Andersons were not arguing that Yazd is factually
identical and therefore universally applicable to this case, which is what the court of
appeals seemed to conclude. Rather, the Andersons were taking a principle of law
concerning a developer's duty from the Yazd case (which was quoted in Smith and which
originated in Loveland) and applying it to Kriser, the developer in this case.
11

present authority below for this proposition, but they simply quoted the more recent cases
of Smith and Yazd, both of which quote and cite that principal from Loveland with
approval and support.
The court of appeals erred by contradicting and misconstruing this Court's
precedents and by misunderstanding the Andersons' application of a statement of law
concerning a developer's duty.
A.

A Developer Does Not Have To Have "Actual Knowledge" of the Contents
of a Geotechnical Report for Liability to Attach.

Speaking to the first point, the court of appeals was mistaken in concluding that a
developer must have "actual knowledge" of the contents of a geotechnical report in order
to be liable under Loveland, Smith, and Yazd. As laid out in Section I supra, this Court
first promulgated a developer's duty in Loveland, but the Court has reiterated and
reaffirmed it in both Smith and Yazd:
a developer . . . has a duty to exercise reasonable care to insure that the . . .
lots are suitable for construction . . . and he must disclose to his purchaser
any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the
subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building.
Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, \ 16 (quoting Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769) (emphases
added); also quoted verbatim with approval in Yazd.
As discussed in Section I supra, this case is factually distinguishable from Smith.
In Smith, the developer was not liable because the developer did not sell the property to
the homebuyer; they were not in privity. Rather, the developer sold the property to a
builder-contractor, who in turn contracted with the homebuyer to sell the lot and
construct a home. The builder-contractor, as the party in a superior position to discover
12

the defect and as the party in privity with the homebuyer, cut off liability to the
developer.
More to the point, the court of appeals mistakenly concluded that a developer must
have "actual knowledge" of a geotechnical report before liability attaches. Anderson,
2009 UT App 319,fflf4-5. This creates a new standard, and more importantly,
contradicts this Court's precedents. Plainly, the court of appeals is incorrect.
In Loveland—and then repeated in Smith and Yazd—this Court has declared and
restated that a developer has a duty to ensure that lots are suitable for construction of a
residence and that the "developer . . . must disclose to his purchaser [i.e., the party in
privity, in this case, the Andersons] any condition which he knows or reasonably ought
to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building." Smith, 2004
UT 55 f 16 (citing Loveland) (emphases added). According to this Court, a developer—
including Kriser—"ought to know" about soil conditions because home construction
requires a high degree of skill, knowledge, and expertise, "including knowledge of soil
conditions." Yazd, 2006 UT 47, ^f 24. And the disparity in that skill and knowledge
between a home buyer and a developer leads to the buyer relying on the expertise of the
developer. Id.
Therefore, even if Kriser did not have "actual knowledge" of the contents of the
Geotech Report, as a developer, he ought to have known about it and ought to have
disclosed it to the Andersons, according to Yazd.

2

Any other result would be absurd. For example, if the Court were to adopt
Kriser's (or the court of appeals') argument, then a developer like Kriser could get a
13

R

The Andersons Raised the "Developer's Duty" Argument in Their
Opposition to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment and in their Opening
Brief.

The court of appeals' second error lies in concluding that the Andersons "asserted
below—without supporting authority—only that Kriser's alleged knowledge of the
existence of the [Geotech] report placed him on notice of its contents." Anderson, 2009
UT App 3195 Tj 5 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
Contrary to the court of appeals' statement, the Andersons quoted the statement of
a developer's duty in its opposition to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment. But the
citation was to Yazd, which was quoting and citing Smith, which was quoting and citing
Loveland. The Andersons simply chose to cite the most recent Utah Supreme Court
case—Yazd—because it was the most recent statement and adoption of a developer's
duty as promulgated by this Court. And in Yazd, this Court was merely reiterating and
quoting with approbation the statement of law from Smith and Loveland concerning a
developer's duty. That does not change the fact that the principle of law for which it
stands—that a developer has a duty to disclose to the purchase any condition he
reasonably ought to know makes the land unsuitable for building—remains the same.

geotechnical report but never read it, never have "actual knowledge" of its contents, and
therefore, escape liability for soil conditions on the land. Surely the law does not reward
such ignorance, and that cannot be what this Court intended or meant to imply in
Loveland, Smith, or Yazd.
In the criminal context, courts sometimes give juries a "willful blindness"
instruction if a "defendant deliberately closed his eyes to what otherwise would have
been obvious to him." United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 652 (3d Cir. 2006). Such
an instruction informs jurors "that they may impose criminal liability on people who,
recognizing the likelihood of wrongdoing, nonetheless consciously refuse to take
investigatory steps." United States v. Azubike, 564 F.3d 59, 66 (1st Cir. 2009).
14

Similarly, in the Anderson's opening appellate brief in the court of appeals, they
adopted the same strategy. They cited to Yazd for this statement of law because Yazd was
the most recent case that quoted this principle of a developer's duty. Yazd quoted it with
approval, which again is why the Andersons chose to cite Yazd rather than Smith or
Loveland. It simply is not that case that when a party cites a case for a discrete principle
of law, that party is adopting the entire cited case as apropos and applicable to the instant
case.
Since Loveland, this Court has restated a developer's duty with approbation in
both Smith and Yazd. In their brief, the Andersons cited the most recent case, Yazd, as
supportive of this discrete principle of law. The Andersons were not trying to analogize
the facts from Yazd; they were merely taking a statement of law from that case and
applying it to this case. The court of appeals seems to have misunderstood, so it
mistakenly concluded that the Andersons did not raise this argument in their opposition
to Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Andersons' opening brief.
IIL

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRONEOUSLY EXCLUDED ARGUMENTS
THAT THE ANDERSONS RAISED IN THEIR REPLY BRIEF,
Last, in footnote three of its opinion, the court of appeals stated that u[t]he

Andersons argue for the first time in their reply brief that Loveland. . . and Smith . . .
impose upon developers '"a duty to exercise reasonable care to [e]nsure that the
subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling
house . . . . ' " Anderson, 2009 UT App 319, ^ 6 n.3 (second alteration in original). The
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court then wrote that because the Andersons raised this argument for the first time in their
reply brief, the argument would not be considered. Id
As explained in Section II supra, the court of appeals is incorrect. The principle
of law cited—and even quoted—by the court of appeals in footnote three is the exact
(and actually only a portion) of that exact quote in the Andersons' opening brief and in
their reply brief. But as explained supra, the Andersons elected to take the quote from
the Yazd case rather from the Smith or Loveland cases because Yazd was this Court's
most recent interpretation and explanation of a developer's duty to a buyer with whom
the developer is in privily. Regardless of which case a party cites, the principle of law
remains the same. Which case the Andersons chose to cite for that principle of law
should be irrelevant as to whether the principle of law applies in a given case.
In addition, the court of appeals also seemed to find a distinction between the
terms used by the parties ("builder-developer") and used by this Court in its cases
("builder-contractor" and "developer"). This confusion cannot be the basis for denying
the Andersons' claims. The Andersons used the term "builder-developer" in their
opening brief because Kriser admitted in his deposition that he was a "developer," which
is sine qua non of the Andersons' case for fraudulent non-disclosure to establish that
Kriser had a developer's duties as established in Loveland and reiterated in Smith and
Yazd.

3

Kriser used the term "builder-developer" in referring to himself in his deposition.
He admitted that his "current occupation" was as a "builder-developer." (R. at 204;
Kriser Dep. 4:16-17.)
16

Therefore, to show that, by his own admission, he was a developer, the
Andersons' used the term "builder-developer." There has never been any confusion or
disagreement that Kriser was not the builder or contractor on the home. Yet the court of
appeals seems to hinge new legal meaning on the Andersons' use of the term in their
opening brief and uses it, in part, to affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Kriser. It seems it is simply a matter of miscommunication and misunderstanding.
Therefore, the Andersons did not raise the argument of a developer's duty for the
first time in their reply brief. They raised it and quoted it verbatim in their opposition to
Kriser's Motion for Summary Judgment (pp. 9-10) and in their opening brief (pp. 11-13).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the court of appeals and
remand to the trial court.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9th day of April 2010.

HILL, JOHNSON & SCHMUTZ, L.C.

Stephen Quesenberry
Charles L. Perschon
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Petitioners
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the contents of the report. The evidence was insufficient
to prevent summary judgment on the issue of the seller's
actual knowledge of the contents of the report. Further,
the seller's knowledge of the report and its contents after
the buyers initiated this lawsuit did nothing to establish
the seller's knowledge at the time of the sale because the
report was attached to the buyers' complaint as an exhibit. Also, the seller did not construct the home and was
not in a builder-contractor relationship with the buyers.

CASE SUMMARY:

OUTCOME: The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's judgment.

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff buyers brought a
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OVERVIEW: The buyers based the fraudulent concealment claim on the seller's alleged knowledge and
nondisclosure of a 1997 soils report. The summary
judgment order dismissed the fraudulent concealment
claim because the buyers failed to provide evidence that
the seller knew about collapsible soils on the bare residential lot. On appeal, the buyers argued that (1) there
was evidence that the seller had actual knowledge of the
contents of the report, and (2) knowledge of the presence
of the collapsible soils was imputed to the seller as a
builder-developer. The appellate court disagreed that the
buyers presented evidence that the seller actually knew
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[HN1] An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal
conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary
judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Once the moving party challenges an element of the nonmoving party's case
on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists,
the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present
evidence that is sufficient to establish a genuine issue of
material fact.

Torts > Business Torts > Fraud & Misrepresentation >
Nondisclosure > Elements
[HN2] In order to prevail on a claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove (1) that the nondisclosed
information is material, (2) that the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3)
that there is a legal duty to communicate.
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OPINION BY: William A. Thome Jr.
OPINION
MEMORANDUM DECISION
THORNE, Judge:
David and Kristine Anderson appeal from the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of
Matthew Kriser. The summary judgment order dismissed
the Andersons' fraudulent concealment claim because the
Andersons failed to provide evidence that Kriser knew
about collapsible soils on a bare residential lot (the property) sold by Kriser to the Andersons.l We affirm.
1 Although there is some dispute as to whether
Kriser sold the property to the Andersons as an
individual developer or as an agent for Country
Living Development, LLC, we treat Kriser as the
seller and developer for purposes of this appeal.
[HN1] "An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate grant or denial of summary

judgment for correctness and views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving [*2] party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, P 6, 177 P.3d 600 (internal quotation
marks omitted). "[0]nce the moving party challenges an
element of the nonmoving party's case on the basis that
no genuine issue of material fact exists, the burden then
shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence that is
sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact."
Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69, P
31, 54F\3d 1054.
The Andersons base their fraudulent concealment
claim on Kriser's alleged knowledge and nondisclosure
of a 1997 soils report (the report) that revealed collapsible soils on the property. [HN2] "In order to prevail on a
claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove
(1) that the nondisclosed information is material, (2) that
the nondisclosed information is known to the party failing to disclose, and (3) that there is a legal duty to communicate." Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47,
P 10, 143 P.3d 283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Kriser, concluding that the Andersons failed to provide
evidence that Kriser knew about the report and the collapsible soils. On appeal, the Andersons argue that (1)
there [*3] is evidence that Kriser had actual knowledge
of the contents of the report and (2) knowledge of the
presence of the collapsible soils was imputed to him as a
builder-developer.
We disagree that the Andersons presented evidence
that Kriser actually knew the contents of the report. In
support of his summary judgment motion, Kriser provided affidavit evidence that at the time of the sale he did
not know about any soils testing that addressed the property's suitability for housing construction and, in particular, had not seen the report. In opposition, the Andersons
argued that Kriser's admitted knowledge of his company's general practice of obtaining soils testing before
development of a subdivision is evidence that he actually
knew about the report and its contents. The Andersons
also argued that, after the lawsuit had been filed, Kriser
told them that he had seen the report.
This evidence is insufficient to prevent summary
judgment on the issue of Kriser's actual knowledge of the
contents of the report. Even assuming that Kriser's
knowledge of a general practice of obtaining soils testing
raises a factual question as to whether he knew of the
report's existence, it does not follow that [*4] Kriser
had actual knowledge of the contents of the report. Indeed, the Andersons asserted below-without supporting
authority-only that Kriser's alleged knowledge of the
existence of the report placed him on notice of its contents. 2 Such a theory of knowledge will not support a
fraudulent concealment claim. See id. ("[T]o prevail on a
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claim of fraudulent concealment, a plaintiff must prove .
.. that the nondisclosed information is known to the party
failing to disclose .. .." (emphasis added)). Additionally,
Kriser's knowledge of the report and its contents after the
Andersons initiated this lawsuit does nothing to establish
Kriser's knowledge at the time of the sale because the
report was attached to the Andersons' complaint as an
exhibit. Under these circumstances, we agree with the
district court that the Andersons have not established a
material question of fact as to Kriser's actual knowledge
of collapsible soils on the property.
2 We note that there is nothing in the record to
suggest that a reasonable person might suspect
that a soils report on the property would contain
information indicating that the property was unsuitable for residential development. To the contrary, [*5] Kriser's deposition testimony indicates that land from which the property was ultimately subdivided was surrounded by existing
housing at the time Kriser's company purchased
it.
The Andersons also argue that Kriser is a builder-developer to whom knowledge of the collapsible soils
was imputed as a matter of law under Yazd v. Woodside
Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, 143 P.3d 283. See generally
id. PP 18-26 (imposing certain legal duties on builder-contractors, with resulting imputed knowledge).
However, it is undisputed in this case that Kriser did not
construct the Andersons' home and, thus, was not in a
builder-contractor relationship with the Andersons under
Yazd at the time the Andersons purchased the property. It
is clear from Smith v. Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P. 3d
919, that ultimate responsibility for the settling and other
damage to the Andersons' house lies with the builder-contractor who actually constructed it. See id. PP
14-27 (cutting off liability of developer to future homeowners upon purchase of lot by builder-contractor, stating that "as a matter of law, a builder of ordinary prudence would have discovered the insufficient compaction"); see also Yazd, 2006 UT 47, P 21, 143 P.3d 283
("Our reasons [*6] for [cutting off developer liability in

Smith] had as much to do with the conclusions that we
reached about the scope of knowledge acquired and the
responsibility assumed by the Smiths' contractor-builder
as with the issue of whether the developer knew of the
poor soil conditions and whether that knowledge was
material."). Because Kriser did not construct the Andersons' home, Yazd neither imposes a duty nor imputes any
knowledge to Kriser. Accordingly, Yazd does not require
us to disturb the district court's summary judgment ruling. 3
3
The Andersons argue for the first time in
their reply brief that Loveland v. Orem City
Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987), and Smith v.
Frandsen, 2004 UT 55, 94 P.3d 919, impose
upon developers "'a duty to exercise reasonable
care to [e]nsure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house,'" Smith, 2004 UT 55, P 16,
94 P. 3d 919 (quoting Loveland, 746 P.2d at 769).
However, arguments not raised in an appellant's
initial brief are waived, and we do not consider
this argument. See Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT 56, P
8, 194 P. 3d 903 ("It is well settled that issues
raised by an appellant in the reply brief that were
not [*7] presented in the opening brief are considered waived and will not be considered by the
appellate court." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Because the Andersons have not demonstrated a
factual dispute about Kriser's actual knowledge of the
collapsible soils, nor have they properly raised an argument of legal imputation of such knowledge, we decline
to disturb the district court's order entering summary
judgment in favor of Kriser. Affirmed.
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge
WE CONCUR:
Gregory K. Orme, Judge
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge

